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In 1981,  the United  States  induced  the Japanese,  Japanese  producers  to enter the U.S. domestic
to agree to a voluntary  export  restraint  (VER)  on  makset  through foreign  direct investment.  Teir
their  exports of autos to the United  States. Using  entry  thenlargely eliminated  the abwormally
a general equilibrium  constant  return  to scale  high profits.
model,  de Melo and Tarr first assess the costs  of
the U.S.-Japan  agreement  at about  $10 billion.  The study sequentially  introduces  into  the
model  the important  elements  of the auto  indus-
The two countries  negotiated  the VtR  try and the VER, tiereby isolating  the impact  of
against  a background  of falling  U.S. production  each on the estimates  of the welfare  effects  of
and  iemployment  in the auto industry  and several  the VER. In the most reasonable  repksentation
legislative  attempts  to curb Japanese  imports.  with increasing  retums  to scale,  pure profits,
The4Jtpanese  agreed  to lihiit their U.S. exports  to  intemationaUy  mobild  capital, and endogenous
1.68  million  vehicles a year for a three-year  conjectures,  the estimate  of the welfare  costs of
period.  the'VER  are $9 bllion;  this is $1 billion  or 10
percent  less than  the estimate  from the constant
The study found  that U.S. auto dealers  ^  returns  to scale  model.
captured  some of the rents from the VER and
that increasing  retums to scale in the U.S. auto  The impact  of fbreign  direct investment  was
industry  imply  that protection  has an effect on  to lower the costs of the VER  because  the greater
scale efficiency.  entry  intQ  domestic  auto  manufacturing  rsulted
In a lower quota  rent premium  for foreijn autos.
From 1984  to 1987,  seven Japanese  auto  The costs  per jobprotect"  in the auto  sector,  at
manufacturing  firms established  assembly  plants  the expense  of employment  elsewhere,  were
in the UIJited  States. De Melo and Taff argue  high, ranging  from $164,000  to°$296,000  a job a
that the-VER  generated  pure profits  in the  °year.
domestic  auto industry  which induced  the
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In  1981,  *  US induced  the  Japanese  to  agree  to  a  -voluntary  export
restraint  SVER)  on  their  exports  of  autos  to  the  US. Among  others,  Baldcn
(1982)  has  noted  that  protection  will  generally  hnive  unintended  effects,  and
the  developments  that  followed  the  introduction  of  the  auto  VER  demonstrate  the
complexity  of  the  VER  mechanism.  Some  have  been  studied  by  previous  authors.
These  includei  (1)  the significant  quality  upgrading  on the part of the
Japanese  auto  producers  (Feenstra,  1984,  1988);  (2)  a spillover  effect  on  US
demand  for  European  autos  which  generated  a  premium  on  European  autos  after
adjusting  for  quality  upgrading  (Dinopoulos  and  Kreinin,  1988);  and  (3)  the
impact  of  the  VER on  imperfectly  competitive  pricing  of  the  US  auto  producers
(Dixit,  1988;  Krishna,  Hogan  and  Swagel,  1989);  (4)  wage  distortions  in  the
auto  industry  may  imply  that  additional  labor  employed  in  the  auto  industry  has
second-best  benefits  (Dixit,  1988;  Krishna,  Hogan  and  Swagel,  1989).l  Xhere
are,  however,  several  other  aspects  of  the  auto  VCR  that  have  not  yet  been
systematically  investigated  and  which  are  the  subject  of this  paper. These
aret  (5)  US auto  dealers  captured  some  of  the  VER  rents; (6)  US  monopsony
power  in  autos  will  imply  a  positive  optimal  tariff,  i.e.  in  the  absence  of
retaliation,  there  are  terms-of-trade  gaLns  that  reduce  the  costs  of  the  VER;
(7)  increasing  returns  to  scale  (IRTS)  in  the  US  auto  industry  implies  that
protection  has  an  effect  on  scale  efficiencyl  (8)  the  existence  of  pure  profits
(perhaps  induced  by  the  VER)  la  the  domestic  auto  industry,  which  will  induce
entry  that  will  also  have  scale  efficiency  effects;  (9)  massive  entry  Lito  the
US  auto  industry  via  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  by  Japanese  auto  producers2
shortly  after  the  VER  went into  effect;  and (10)  the  proper  evaluation  of rent
capture  whi  ..  implibs  an endogenous  treatment  of the rent  premium.
This  paper  explores  systematically  the  Impact  of  these  effects  induced
by the  VER.  We first  estimate  the effects  of the  VER under  constant  returns
to scale (CRTS),  without  wage distortions  and  without  US citizens  capturing
rents. We then  sequentially  introduce  the  elements  mentioned  above  one  by  one.
In this  manner  we isolate  the impact  of each of the  effects  on the  welfare
estimate  of the  effects  of the  VER,  ultimately  arriving  at  a representation  of
the  auto  industry  which  we believe  yields  a  better  estimate  of the  costs  of  the
auto  VER.  The reader  is  thus  able to readily  assess  the  impact  of each  of the
effects or  industry attributes on the  calculation  of the  costs of VER
protection.  Moreover, because our modelling recognizes IRTS  and wage
distortions,  we also estimate separately  the welfare gains from applying
"optimal'  trade  and subsidy  policy  to take these  features  into  account.
Interest  in  systematic  calculations  of  the  costs  of  the  auto  VER  arises
out  of  the  interaction  of several  ambiguous  effects. For  example,  as shoun  by
Dixit  (1986)  and  by  Rodrik  (1988),  entry  to  eliminate  pure  profits  will riduce
monopolistic  price  distortion  (a  benefit),  but  will reduce  scale  efficiency  (a
cost).  In  addition,  if  entry  occurs  through  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI),
Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro  (1977)  have shown that the repatriation  of the
private returns  to capital can be immiserizing  if the private and social
returns  to capital  are  different  due to  distorted  prices,  such  as  would  occur
under  a quota.  In addition,  increased  entry  with FDI imposes  greater  costs
through  reduced  scale  efficiency.  But  the  costs  of  the  VER  are  reduced  through
another  channel. In a  world  of differentiated  products,  entry  will reduce  the
price  of  domestic  autos,  which  in  turn  will reduce  the  demand  for  and  the  price3
of imported  autos.  Since  the  rent  premium  on imported  autos  is endogenously
determined  as the difference  between  the price on the tariff-ridde.l  deu'..1d
curve  at tne rationed  quantity  of autos  under  the  VER and the  world price  of
autos inclusive  of transport  cc-ts,  entry  will also reduce  the rent premium
earned  by foreigners. Thus,  entry  has  greater  benefits  when the  rent  premium
is correctly  determined  endogencously  than  when the rent premium is treated
exogenously.
We estimate  the effects  of the  VER  with a general  equiiibrium  model
because three of the items above (4, 6 and 9), are fundamentally  general
equilibrium  effects. As a  result,  we estimate  the  combined  effects  of:  (1)  the
effects  of FDI  in  a second-best  environment;  (2)  the  second  best  gain  of labor
reallocation  when  an industry  with a  wage  premium  receives  protection;  (3)  the
biases likely to occur in a partial equilibrium  approach.  Our preferred
representation  of the  U.S.  auto  industry  during  the  VER is  one  of  mvnopolistic
competition  on  the  domestic  market  with  above  normal  profits  caused  by the  VER
and a  wage premium  paid to auto  workers.  To anticipate  our  main results,  we
find  that  a perfect  competition  model  which incorporates  wage distortions  and
domestic  rent  capture  results  in an  estimate  of costs  of the  VER of about  $10
billion,  and almost $250,000  per job protected  in autos at the expense  of
employment  elsewhere.  In the preferred  monopolistic  competition,  initial
profit  model,  the  estimated  costs  are  reduced  by  about  10  percent  depending  on
the assumption  made regarding  oligopolistic  conjectures. The ratio  of the
costs  of the  auto  VER to the  benefits  (in  saved  adjustment  costs)  are  between
14 and  26 to 1.  Endogenous  rent  determination  results  in significantly  lower
estimated  costs  of the  VER because  domestic  entry  reduces  the rent premium.
The impact  of FDI is to lower  the  costs  of the  VER if,  and  only if,  the  rent4
premium  is  deturmined  endogenously.  Then  the  greater  entry  into  domestic  auto
manufacturFrg  lovers  the  rent  premium,  which  dominate  scale  efficiency  loss  and
immiserizing  effectL  of FDI.
Th- remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows. In section  2,  we
review  the  main stylized  facts  of the  U.S. auto  industry  that  are  modelled  in
the remainder  of the paper.  Modelling specifications  and calibration  are
discussed  in section  3.  Section  4 reports  on  welfare  cost calculations  under
the standard  traditional  assumption  of a  competitive  market in the  U.S. auto
industry.  Estimates  of  the  effects  of  wage  distortions,  partial  domestic  quota
rent capture,  endogenous  terms-of-trade  and  the partial  equilibrium  bias are
provided.  Corresponding  calculations  under  various Imperfectly  competitive
market  structures  are reported  in section  5.  Optimal  tariff  and production
subsidy calculations,  which  are  rarely executed in  computable general
equilibrium  exercises,  are presented  in section  6.  Conclusions  follows  iA
section  7.
'.  The  U.S.  Auto Industry  During  the  U.S.-Japan  VER
In  the Spring of 1981, after negotiations  with U.S. gorernment
officials,  the  Japanese  government  announced  t-';t  it  would  voluntarily  restrain
its  exports  to the  U.S.  The Japanese  agreed  to limit  their  exports  of autos
to the  U.S. to 1.68  million  vehicles  per  year  between  April  1, 1981  and  March
31, 1984.  Between  April  1, 1984,  and  March  31,  1985,  Japanese  auto  exports  to
the  U.S.  were limited  to  1.85  million  vehicles.  This  action  was  taken  against
a background  of falling  U.S.  production  and  employment  in  autos,  and  a numbsr
of legislative  attempts  to curb  Japanese  imports.  After  the  US Administration
failed to request an extension of the auto VER, the Japanese government5
continued  to  restrain  itc  auto  exports  to  the  US,  but  at  the  !.se  restrictive
level  of  2.3  miillion  vehicles  per  year. 2 The  Japanese  action  may  have  been
motivated  by  fear  of  Congressional  pressure  to  reintroduce  a  VER,  or  by  their
learning  they  had  monopoly  power  they  wished  to  continue  to  exploit.
After  adjusting  for  the  si3nficant  product  up-eading  that  took  place,
Feenstra  (1984  and  1988)  found  that  Japanese  manufact  rers  eari.ed  premia  on
their  US  sales  of  over  17  percent  in  1984  as  a  result  of  the  VER. Dinopoulos
and  Kreinin  (1988)  also  adjusted  for  product  upgrading  on  European  autos  (which
was  less  significant),  and  found  a significant  spillover  effect  on  the  price
of  European  autos.  These  spillover  effects  could  be  explained  by  a  variety  of
reasons  including:  (1)  new  found  monopoly  power  because  the  VER restrained  the
Japanese  (see  Krishna,  1989  on quotas  as a facilitating  practice);  (2)  an
upward  sloping  supply  curve  of  a  competitive  industry;  or  (3)  fear  of  restraint
by the  US  Congress.  As  explained  in  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (1990b),  combining  the
estimates  of  Feenstra  and  Dinopolous  and  Kreinin  implies  that  the  weighted
average  premium  rate  earned  by  European  and  Japanese  auto  exporters  on  their
sales  to  the  U.S.  in  1984  was  31.8  percent,  yielding  $7.87  billion  of  rents  to
foreign  auto  exporters.
In  addition,  there  is  evidence  that  during  the  '-q  period,  Japanese
manufacturers  allowed  their  US dealers  to capture  part  of the  rents. 3 O(n
explanation  of this  phenomenon  is that  this  practice  developed  a  strong  US
dealer  network. Another  is that it retained  goodwill. A third  is the
allegation  that  US auto dealers  of Japanese  autos threatened  collective
antitrust  action  to  void  the  VER  if  they  did  not  receive  a price  from  their
suppliers  that  would  allow  them  to  capture  some  of  the  rents.  Accordingly,  we
assume  that  US  dealers  of  Japanese  autos  earned  $500  of  rents  per  vehicle  due6
to  the  VER,  but  US  dealers  of  European  vehicles  earned  no  rents.  This  implies
that  there  were  rents  earned  on the  sale  of Japanese  autos  during  the  VER
period  in  addition  to  those  estimated  by  Feenstra.  Under  this  assumpt!.on,  the
weighted  average  premium  paid  on  all  imported  autos  was  36.4  percent  (instead
of  31.8  percent)  and  US  residents  captured  10  percent  of  the  rents. 4
After  adjusting  for  human  capital  and  demographic  factors  such  as  age,
sex,  education  and  race,  Krueger  and  Summers  (1988)  have  estimated  that  workers
in  certain  industries  earn  wage  premia;  in  particular,  they  estimated  a 27
percent  premium  for  workers  in  the  transportation  sector.  This  is  the  premium
we apply  to auto  workers. 5 They,  and  Katz  and  Summers  (1988),  argue  that
efficiency  wage  theories  generally  explain  these  wage  differences,  but  that  in
the  case  of  autos,  the  premia  appear  to  be  explained  by  unionization.  Assuming
that  workers  in  all  industries  aze  employed  up  to  the  point  where  the  value  of
their  marginal  preduct  equals  their  wage,  this  premium,  so long  as it is
exogenc.us,  implies  that a  reallocation  of workers  to autos should  be
efficiency-improving  thereby  reducing  the  welfare  costs  of  protection.  Since
the  welfare  effect  of reallocating  labor  from  other  sectors  to the auto
industry  depends  on  the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  marginal  product
of  labor  in  autos  and  other  sectors,  a  correct  evaluation  requires  a  general
equilibrium  model.
Should  the  US  be  regarded  as  a  country  which  is  unable  to  significantly
influence  the  price  at which  foreigners  supply  autos,  or does  it possess
monopsony  power  on  world  auto  markets?  The  results  of  Dinopolous  and  Kreinin
provide  some  indirect  evidence  in  support  of  the  latter  view. Accordingly,  we
simulate  two  extreme  alternativess  (1)  the  US  is  unable  to  influence  the  world
price  of  autos  (infinite  import  supply  elasticity):  and  (2)  an  import  supply7
elasticity  of  five. In  the  latter  case,  an  elementary  model  would  euggest  an
optimum  tariff  of  about  20  percent.
All  of  the  above  effects  can  be  analyzed  in  a  constant  returns  to  scale
(CRTS)  model. However,  Friedlender,  Winston  and  Wang  (1983)  and  Winston  and
Associates  (1987)  have  estimated  that  the  US auto  industry  operates  under
increasing  returns  to  scale  (IRTS).  Accordinaly,  we  also  evaluate  the  effects
of  the  VER  in  a  model  where  the  auto  sector  has  IRTS.
Finally,  table  1  documents  two  important  facts  about  the  VER  period  not
previously  investigated.  First,  profits  in  the  U.S.  auto  industry  were  very
high by  historical  standards  from 1983 to  1986, declining,  almost
monotonically,  after  reaching  their  peak  in  1984.6 As mentioned  above,  the
VER  was  in  place  until  March  31,  1985,  after  which  a  Japanese  VER  remained  in
effect,  apparently  without  US  Administration  request.  Second,  the  data  show
that  increased  FDI followed  the  negotiation  of the  VER agreement  and the
appearance  of  high  profits  in  the  US  auto  indust-'.  FDI  peaked  in  1986.
We  believe  these  series  are  related  and  would  argue  that  once  the  US
recession  of  1981  and  1982  ended,  the  VER  allowed  above  normal  profits  in  the
U.S. auto industry. The hishly  profitable  US market  could,  however,  be
accessed  by  the  Japanese  through  FDI. (Bhagwati  (1987)  has  referred  to  this
as VER-jumping].  If investment  responds  to  profits  with  a lag,  it is  no
surprise  that  the  years  of large  investments  began  in  1984.  The  U.S. "Big
Three"  (GM,  Ford  and  Chrysler),  which  had  very  little  domestic  competition
following  the  exit  of other  U.S.  auto  producers  (e.g.  Studebaker,  Hudson,
Packard),  were  suddenly  facing  stiff  competition  in  the  U.S. Between  1984  and
1987,  seven  Japanese  firms  (Honda,  Toyota,  Nissan,  Mazda,  Isuzu,  Mi.tsubishi,
and  Fuji)  established  car  assembly  plants  on  U.S.  territory.  As  the  JapaneseS
Table  I
Profits  and Foreign  Direct  Investment  ln the  V.S.  Auto Industry
Profits  a/  Foreign  Direct  Investment bl
Assembly  narts
1979  4.7  200.0  N.A.
1980  -5.0  200.0  N.A.
1981  -1.1  500.0  NA.
1982  -0.8  65.0  4.0
1983  5.1  101.4  32.0
1984  9.9  487.5  48.0
1985  6.8  6:8.0  71."
1986  2.2  850.8  234.8
1987  0.5  435.5  '3.7
1988  2.4  419.5  80.8
1989  -1.4  NLA.  N.A.
Notes.-
N.A.:  Not available.
al  Billion  of current  dollars.
Source: U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Survey  of Current  Business,  July.
various  issues.
b/  Millions  of  current  dollars. Includes  plant  and  other  investment.  Prior
to 1982,  data  cover  only  FDI in assembl7  plants  above  $50  million.
Source: U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in the
United  States,  various  issues  and  unpublished  data of the  Office  of
Trade  Investment,  U.S. Department  of Commerce.9
followed  their  practice  of vertical  integration,  IDI  ln  parts  continued  to
rise,  even  after  FDI  in  assembly  plants  tapered  off  when  the  market  became
saturated  with  producers. 7 In sum,  we believe  that  the  VER  generated  pure
profits  in  the  US  auto  market  which  were  then  largely  eliminated  by Japanese
entry.  Consequently,  we also  estimate  the effects  of the  VER under  the
assumption  that  it  induced  pure  proflte  in  1984  that  were  eliminated  by  entry
including  FDI.
3.  Modelling  the  Auto  Industry
We now  describe  briefly  how  we  model  the  auto  industry  under  IRTS.
Following  Harris  (1984)  and  Cox  and  Harris  (1985),  we assume  that  output  is
produced  by  N identical  firms  indexed  over  i  so  that  sectoral  output  is  X-  Nsi
where  xi is the output  of the ith firm,  and we have suppressed  sector
subscripts.  We define  total  costs,  TC,  and  *verage  costs,  AC, in  terms  of
fixed  costs,  FC,  and  variable  costs,  VC,  where  fixed  costs  are  defined  bys
FC  F  (NiN)/  (KFR  + LFW)
where  a  bar  over  a  variable  indicates  that  it  is  exogenous,  N is  the  initlal
number  of  firms,  KF  and  LF  are  the  amount  of  capital  and  labor  required  to  keep
a firm  open,  and  W and  R  are  the  prices  (relative  to  the  numeraire)  of  labor
and  capital  respectively.  (In  the  simulations  reported  here,  the  model  is
calibrated  so  that  labor  and  capital  shares  in  fixed  costs  are  the  same.)  Unit
variable  costs  are  constant.
Each  firm  produces  identical  products  which  are  differentiated  from
(identical)  imports.  This  national  product  differentiation  is  also  applied  to10
export sales  which are differentiated  from domestic  sales.  This symmetric
treatment of  imports and  exports is modelled by  assuming CES  and  CET
aggregation  functions  for imports  and domestic  output  on the one hand, and
domestic  output  and  exports,  on the  other  hand.
For pricing,  we assume that US auto firms  price competitively  in
export  markets  beLause  they face  stiff  foreign  competition.  The  assumption  is
plausible,  and  not  crucial  empirically  because  exports  accounted  for  less  than
4 percent  of total  industry  sales  (see  table  2).
our  preferred  pricing  rule  for  domestic  sales  is to  assume  that  each
firm  behaves  in  the  domestic  market  as  an oligopolist  facing  a  downward  sloping
demand  curve. Firms  form  conjectures  regarding  the  output  reactions  of their
domestic  competitors.  Denote  by G ,  the  ith  firm's  conjecture  with respect  to
the  change  in  domestic  industry  output  when it  changes  its  output  by one  unit.
By symmetry,  the  marginal  costs  and  conjectural  variation  parameters  are  equal
for all firms in the industry.  Profit  maximization  then implies  that, at
equilibrium,  each firm sets  marginal  revenue  equal  to  marginal  costs,  MC, so
that:
(2)  (PD  - MC)/PD  - Od/(N  ad)
where  ed  is  the  market  elasticity  of  demand. Note  that  in  the  simulations,  the
number  of firms  N  and  the  market  elasticity  of  demand  are  endogenous  variables,
where  the  latter  is a share  weighted  average  of  the  elasticities  of demand  for
final and for intermediate  sales implied  by functional  forms for consumer
behavior  and technology.11
Equation  2  defines  the  percentage  markup  over  marginal  costs  in  terms
of  N,  ad  and  ed. Given  data  on  prices,  costs  and  elasticities,  only  the  ratio
of  ad  to  N is  identified.  Given  Ed  and  N  equal  to  3  in  1984  (General  Motors,
Ford  and  Chrysler),  we  calibrate  ad  at  0.72,  i.e.,  pricing  was  more  competitive
than  Cournot.  An equivalent  approach,  followed  by  Dixit  (1988)  is  to  enter
Cournot  conjectures  (ad_ 1),  and  calibrate  N,  the  'Cournot  equivalent  number  of
firms." 8 Dixit  calibrated  the  Cournot  equivalent  number  of firms  in  1979,
1980  and  1983.  If  domestic  firms  are  counted  by  corporation  (rather  than  by
division),  then  Dixit's  results  indicate  that  pricing  was  more  competitive  than
Cournot  in  all  three  years  he  examined,  and,  of  the  three  years,  pricing  was
the  most competitive  in 1980 and least  competitive  in 1979.9  In their
estimates  during  the  period  1979  to  1984,  Krishna,  Hogan and  Swagel  (1989)
found  that  pricing  was the  least  competitive  in  1984. They  also  find  that
pricing  was  more  competitive  than  Cournot  in all  years  they  examined.  We
conclude  that  our  c&librated  conjecture  is  a reasonable  estimate.
It  is  likely  that  conjectures  will  change  as  a result  of  firm  entry.
Intuitively,  as the  number  of firms  increases,  in the limit,  the  industry
becomes  competitive  and  conjectures  should  approach  competitive  (Q4  - 0).lO
To capture  this  effect,  in some simulations,  we estimate  the effect  of
additional  competition  by  adding  the  following  ad  hoc  equation:
(3)  ad  d  Cd  IN/N 
where  0d  is  the  conjecture  in  the  initial  calibrated  equilibrium.  When  we  use 0
equation  (3),  we say  that  conjectures  are  endogenous.12
The  conjectural  variation  approach  has  been  criticized  because  lt
involves  applying  a static  concept  to  an  lnherently  dynamic  problem.  It  can,
however,  be  defended  as  an  equilibrium  to  a  dynamlc  game,  and,  in  any  case  it
is  used  by  most  authors  dealing  with  imperfect  competition  models  in  applied
trade  problems.  We also  assume  that  domestic  firms  form  Cournot  conjectures
with  respect  to foreign  rivals  so  that  the  output  reaction  of foreign  firms
does  not  appear  in  (2).
To lsolate  scale  efficlency  effects  from  entry  effects,  we also
consider  a  contestable  markets  pricing  rule,  in  which  case  the  threat  of  entry
forces  incumbent  firms  to  price  at  average  costs:
(4)  PX  AC
where  PX  is  a  weighted  sum  of  domestic  and  export  sales  prlces.  Because  of  the
evidence  of  entry,  contestable  markets  is  not  our  preferred  pricing  rule.
When  we  assume  that  the  VER  leads  to  pure  profits,  drawing  on  the  data
in  tables  1  and  2  and  related  data  on  profits,  we  assume  pure  profits  in  1984
of  $9.4  billion. 11 This  yields  a  rate  of  proflt  of  8  percent.
As suggested  by the evidence  in section  2, firm  entry  was the
mechanism  by which  excess  profits  were  elimlnated.  Thls  implies  that  the
following  equation  is  added:
(5)  PROFITS  - 0
will determine  the number  of firms  in the  monopolistic  competitlon  case
described  above.13
When there  are initial  profits,  the calibration  must be decomposed
into  two  parts  s  (1)  how  much do  average  costs  depart  from  marginal  costsI  and
(2) what is the mark up of price over average costs (due to imperfect
competition). Independently  of initial  profits  in  autos,  the  amount  of fixed
costs  is  determined  by the  value  of  the  cost-disadvantage  ratio  given  in  table
2. To  incorporate  fixed  costs  while  replicating  observed  prices  and  quantities
in  the  CRTS  case,  the  primary  variable  cost  component  of  total  cost  is  reduced
by the  amount  of fixed  costs.
When  there  are  initial  profits,  in  a  first  step  we carry  out  the  same
allocation  of total  costa  into  fixed  and  variable  components  described  above.
In a second  step,  given the  profit  rate per unit of domestic  sales  and the
quantities  and foreign  prices  (expressed  relative  to the  numeraire),  we solve
for  the  vector  of  prices  that  satisfies  the  constraint  that the  firm  earn  the
rate of return  given  by the initial  data. 12 As before,  the calibration  of
gd  is obtained  by solving  (2)  but  with the  newly calculated  set  of domestic
prices.
Finally,  is  the  issue  of  modelling  capital  mobility. We  consider  two
polar cases.  When capital  is internationally  immobile,  the rental  rate on
capital  is determined  endogenously  and  the aggregate  capital  stock  is fixed.
When  capital  is  internationally  mobile,  we assume  perfect  mobility. Then,  the
rental  rate on capital  is fixed  in terms  of the numeraire  by an infinitely
elastic  supply  of capital  available  on international  markets  and  the capital
stock  is  variable. When there  is  perfect  capital  mobility,  the  rental income
from  PDI accrues  to the foreign  owners  of capital  who repatriate  the rental
income. Capital  inflow  and  outflow  are treated  symietrically.  Thus,  the14
domestic  economy  achieves  additional  output  from  the  use  of  foreign  capital,
but it  loses  the  rentals.
The  remaining  features  of  the  model  are  standard  to  computable  general
equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  The  model  includes  two  factors,  capital  and  labor,
mobile  between  sectors.  Labor  is  always  in  fixed  supply. 13 Domestic  demand
includes  two  components,  final  and  intermediates.  The  government  sector's  role
is  limited  to  lump-sum  redistributions  to  and  from  the  representative  consumer.
In  the  simulations  reported  below,  the  auto  sector  is  embedded  in  the  static
ten-sector  model  described  in  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (199Ob).  In  the  calibration  to
1984,  tariffs  are  set  at  their  levels  in  1984  (an  economy  wide  average  of  3.5
percent)  and  the  quotas  in  textiles  and  apparel  resulting  in  a  premium  rate  of
40.5  percent  are  also  maintained  at  their  base  year  level.
Table  2  describes  the  structure  of  the  U.S.  auto  industry  in  1984.
Imports  represented  26  percent  of  domestic  output,  the  bulk  of  which  went  to
final  demand.  As  mentioned  above,  exports  were  negligible.  The  measure  of
scale  economies  captures  the  degree  of  multiproduct  scale  economies  at the
level  of  output  achieved  by  General  Motors,  Ford  and  Chrysler  in  1983. Price
elasticities  of  demand  are  taken  from  Levinsobn  (1988).14
4.  Welfare  Cost  Estimates  under  CRTS
4.1  Benchmark  Estimates
We begin  with  the  benchmark  estimate  of  the  auto  VER  under  CRTS  in
table  3. Welfare  is  evaluated  by  the  Hicksian  equivalent  variation  measure.
We decompose  the total  costs  of the  VER into  two  components:  rent  costs
(reported  in  column  2) and  distortion  costs  (reported  in column  3).15 We
evaluate  these  components  by estimating  the total  costs  of the VER and15
separately  estimating  the benefits  of capturing  rents from foreigners.  The
distortion  costs  are  defined  as the  difference  between  the  two  estimates.
The  simulated  estimate  of the  gain  from  rent  capture  is  close  to the
initial  exogenous  estimate (see table 2), but is slightly  lower than the
initial  value  of rents  because  capturing  rents  results  in an income  increase
that  will lead  to  an increase  in  demand  for  imported  autos. This  increase  gets
translated into a  higher rent premium (now captured  domestically)  which
increases  the  distortion  costs  of the  VER.
Although  auctioning  quota  rights  is  often  recommended  as a  device  to
capture  quota rents (e.g.,  Bergsten  et al. (1987)),  in this instance  quota
right  auction  will likely  be ineffective.  First,  since  a significant  portion
of the  rents  were  captured  by Europeans,  and  there  was  no  explicit  VER  or quota
against  the  Europeans,  it is  doubtful  that  auctioning  quota  rights  would  have
resulted  in rent capture.  In addition,  to the extent  that there  is monopoly
power in  exporting,  Krishna  (1990)  has shown  that  auctioning  quota  rights  may
not capture rents.  This is because the price at which the exporters  with
monopoly  power  are  willing  to supply  the  market  will increase  with a binding
quota,  thereby  reducing  the  value  of a  license  to import.  In this  setting,  a
tariff at the rate of the quota premium from each region,  would be the
instrument  best  suited  to  capture  rents.
Sensitivity  of the  welfare  cost  estimates  to systematic  variation  in
demand  and supply  elasticities  in the first three rows indicates  that the
estimates  of the  distortion  costs  of the  VER increase  with demand  and supply
elasticities.  This  is  because  the  price  decrease  from  removing  the  VER  induces
a larger  increase  of auto  purchases  with larger  elasticities,  i.e,  a larger16
Table  2
Production,  Demand  Structure,  and  Elasticities  in the
Auto  Industry
Premium  Rate on Imports  36.4Z  (31.81)
Rents  Accruing  to Foreigners-  7.87  (7.87)
Rents  Accruing  to US Citizens  0.87  (0.0)
Wage Distortion  in  Autosb/  27.0?
Production  and  Demand-/
Gross  Output  124.2
Domestic  Final  Demand  Sales  111.0




Final  Demand  30.3
Elasticities  and  Parameters-
Capital-Labor  Substitution  0.8
Import-Domestic  Substitution  Elasticity-  1.9
Composite  Final  Demand  0.8
Export-Domestic  Transformation  Elasticity-  2.9
Calibrated  Domestic  Conjecture  (D  d)  0.72
Derived  Price  Elasticity  of Demand  (6  )  1.37
Cost  Disadvantage  RatioeI  0.11
Notes:  Second  column  estimates  assume  no rent  capture  by US
dealers  of Japanese  auto  imports.
a/  1984  USS billion.
b/  Krueger  and  Summers  (1988).
c/  Sources  for  demand  and  supply  elasticities  are  detailed  in  de
Melo and  Tarr (1990a).
dl  The selected  CES (CET)  functions  imply  that  the  corresponding
substitution (transportation)  elasticitieR  are  compensated
import  demand  (export  supply)  elasticities.
el  Friedlaender,  Winston and  Wang  (1983); and  Winston  and
associates  (1987).17
deadweight loss triangle.  On  the other hand,  rent cost estimates *re
insensitive  to changes in elasticities. In the remainder  of the paper,  we
report  only simulations  with central  elasticity  estimates. 16
In row  4  we recognize  that  US dealers  of  Japanese  autos  captured  some
rents over and above the rents captured  by the Japanese.  The gain from
removing  the price  wedge caused  by the  VER increases  by about $500  million.
This is because  there  is now a greater  price  wedge  between  the price  pald  by
US consumers  and the price at which imported  autos are available  on world
markets.
In  row  5,  we add  the  effects  of  a  27  percent  exogenous  wage  dLstortion
in the  auto industry. Now auto  workers  have a higher  marginal  product  value
than  workers  in  other  industries,  so  the  reduction  of  auto  employment  when the
VER is removed  reduces  the  magnitude  of the  gain.  The  second  best  effect  is,
however,  quite  small  since  the  estimated  gains  from  removing  the  VER  are only
reduced  by $200  million  relative  to row  4.
In row 6, we assume  the US has monopsony  power in autos with an
elasticity  of import  supply  of autos  of 5.  Now  when the  VER is removed,  U.S.
importers  pay  a  higher  price. This  terms-of-trade  effect  reduces  the  beneflts
of VER removal  substantially. In fact,  due to the terms  of trade  loss,  the
economy  gains  $500  million  more  from  rent  capture  (which  does  not  significantly
affect  import  quantities  or the  terms  of  trade)  than  it  does  from  removing  the
VER.  We report  this  as a  negative  distortlon costu  of the  VER.
4.2  Quantifying  the  Partial  Equilibrium  Bias
Partial equilibrium  analysis  typically  ignores the pressure that
protection  removal  and  increased  imports  in  one sector  impose  on the18
Table  I
Welfare  Coet et  Ase VEt  _wdr CM
(  1964  billies)
EnployF  nt
Total  Rent  1ie'1ortion Chont  n
Costs  Cots  !ts  t  /  Autos  $
ColIumn  18(2+B)  2  a  4
1  Low  Elasticity  3/  6.92  7.71 (88.9)  1.21  -22.6
2. Central  Elasticity  9.92  7.80 (82.5)  2.02  -U6.2
3. High  Elasticity  S/  10.84  7.88 (82.2)  8.01  -84.1
4. Central  Elasticity
with  US  capturing
come  rents  10.26  7.77  (87.1)  2.51  -40.9
5. Central  Elasticity  with
US  capturing  some  rents
and xog  onous  wage
distortions  10.01  7.77 (87.1)  2.31  -40.9
6. Central  Elasticity  with
US  capturing  some  rents,
-xogenous  wage  distortions
and  *ndogonous  terms  of
trade  7.27  7.77 (87.1)  -0.60  -80.7
Distortion  costs  are  calculated  as  the  dilfference  betwen  totel  costs  and
rent  costs.
/  Thousand  san  years.
2/ Low  (high)  elasticity  estimated  are  obtained  by  lowertng  (increasing)
central  elasticity  values  by  one  standard  deviation.19
equilibrium  real exchange  rate  via the  balance  of trade  constraint.  We
simulate  the  bias  of  omitting  the  balance  of  trade  constraint  by fixing  the
real  exchange  rate  and  allowing  the  trade  balance  (expressed  in  foreign  prices
relative  to the numeraire)  to be endogenously  determined.  Otherwise,
assumptions  are  those  for  the  simulation  reported  in  row  5.  Now  the  welfare
gain  is  $17.7  billion.  The  increase  in  welfare  gain  of  $7.6  billion  (relative
to  row  5)  is  accounted  for  almost  fully  by  an  increase  in  the  trade  deficit  of
$7.5  billion.  Since  an  increase  in  the  trade  deficit  is  a  permanent  free  lunch
from  the  rest  of the  world,  we interpret  the  additional  $7.6  billion  as  an
estimate  of  the  magnitude  o:  the  partial  equilibrium  bias. If,  in  addition,
the  US has monopsony  power  in auto  imports  at the level  assumed  in the
simulations  reported  in  row  6,  then  a failure  to  adjust  for  endogenous  terms-
of-trade  will  increase  the  bias  by  an  additional  $2.8  billion. Thus,  these
estimates  decompose  the  separate  terms-of-trade  effect  and  partial  equilibrium
bias  of  ignoring  the  balance  of  trade  constraint  which  are  sometimes  confused
as  one  effect.
5. Welfare  Cost  Estimates  under  IRTS  and  International  Capital  Mobility
So  far,  the  more  realistic  estlmate  of  the  cost  of  the  VER  is  the  case  in
which  U.S.  citizens  capture  some  rents  and  there  is  a  wage  premium  paid  to  U.S.
auto  workers. It  is  reproduced  as  the  reference  case  in  row  0  of table  4.
Start  with  the  contestable  market  pricing  scenario  (row  1)  which  isolates
scale  efficiency  effects  since  there  is  no firm  entry. Compared  with  the
reference  CRTS  case,  the  distortionary  cost  estimate  is  cut  by 48  percent.
This  is  because  removing  the  VER  Induces  a  reduction  of  domestic  auto  output.
With  contestable  markets  there  is  no  firm  exit  which  forces  existing  firms  to20
Table  4
Welfare  Cost  of  Auto  VIis  vnder  IRTS  and  Internatienal  Capital  Nobility
(Izogenous  Wage  Distortions  and  Partial  Rent  Capture  by  US In  all  Siealations)
(S 1984  billion)
Total  Removal  Rent  Distortion  Employment  a/  Entry/Exit
Costs  Profits  Costsf  Costs  Change  in  Autos  (C  change)
col  (+)  (-)
1--2+3+4  2  3  4  5  6b  p
0. CRTS  reference  case  10.08  7.77  (37.1)  2.31  -40.9
1. Contestable  Market  Pricing  9.00  7.79  (37.1)  1.21  -24.5  - -
2. Monopolistic  Competition  9.77  7.79  (37.1)  1.98  -22.1  - -5.4
3. Monopolistic  Competition  and
Initial  Profits  (MCIP)  10.39  -1.91  7.00  (33.4)  1.48  -35.47  33.7  -6.0
4. MCIP  and  International  Capital  10.23  -1.88  6.85  (32.8)  1.50  -34.54  33.9  -5.9
Mobility  (157.1)dl  (-1.5)el
5. MCIP  and  Endogenous  7.99  -1.91  7.00  (33.4) -0.92  30.4  33.7  -4.5
Terms  of  Trade
6. MCIP and  Intermational  Capital
Mobility  under  Endogenous  7.86  -1.88  6.85  (32.8) -0.87  29.7  33.9  -4.4
Terms  of  Trade  (157.1)di  (-0.7)e/
7. MCIP  with  International  Capital  7.90  -0.06  6.63  (31.9)  1.21  39.5  21.8  -3.5
Mobility  and  Endogenous  Conjectures  (168.3)dl  (-1.5)el
8. MCIP  with  International  Capital
Mobility  Endogenous  Conjectures  and  5.66  -0.06  6.63  (31.9) -1.03  34.6  21.8  -2.6
Endogenous  Terms of  Trade  (168.3)dl  (-1.50)
al Thousand  man years.  Employment change  from  removing  the  VER starting  from  solution  with  no  initial  profits  plus  the
negative  of  the  employment change  from  the  simulation  to  eliminate  initial  profits.
bl Remove profits.
cl Remove  QRs  from  zero  profits  solution.
dl Net  capital  inflow  from  removing  profits  (S  million).
el Net  capital  inflow  from  removing  QR  starting  from  solution  with  initial  profits  (S  million).
fl Figures  in  parentheses  next  to  rent  cost  estimates  are  endogenous  premia  rates.21
operate  at  a  lower  scale.  However  we  h&ve  argued  that  monopolistic  competitlon
is  the  more  realistic  behavioral  assumption  for  the  auto  industry.  In  that
case  (row  2),  the  reduction  in  demand  for  domestic  autos  induces  firm  exit
which  nearly  compensates  for  the  scale  efficiency  loss  from  reduced  output,  so
that  the  distortionary  cost  component  is  larger  than  with  contestable  markets.
Note,  however,  that  the  distortion  cost  with  monopoilistic  competition  is  less
than  with  CRTS.  Thus,  contrary  to the  result  emphasized  by Horstman  and
Markusen  (1986),  in  this  scenario,  protection  induces  a  slight  movement  down
the average  cost curve  because  the effect  of protection  removal  on the
reduction  of  demand  for  domestic  output  dominates  the  effect  of inefficient
firm  entry.  Despite  a firm  exit  rate  of 5.4 percent,  average  output  of
remaining  firms  decreases.
Now  allow  for  the  profits  due  to the  VER. We model  the  VER  as creating
a  profit  that  induces  firm  entry  until  profits  are  eliminated,  but  as  long  as
the  VER  remains  in  effect,  the  traditional  rent  and  distortion  costs  remain.
Firm  entry  is  required  to  eliminate  profits. Consequently,  we simulate  the
costs  of the VER under  this scenario  by decomposing  the costs  into  two
components.  First,  we  estimate  the  costs  of  firm  entry  to  eliminate  profits
caused  by the  VER.  Second,  we estimate  the  remaining  costs  of the  VER  by
removing  the  VER  from  this  counterfactually  created  zero  profit  equilibrlum.
The  total  costs  of  the  auto  VER  are  then  the  sum  of  the  two  component  costs
with  the  second  component  disaggregated,  as  before,  into  a  distortionary  cost
and  a  rent  cost. 17
In  row  3,  we allow  for  profits,  but  assume  no international  capital
mobility  and retain  exogenous  conjectures.  Firm  entry  to eliminate  profits
results  in  estimated  costs  of  $1.91  billion.  The  estimate  is  negative  because22
the required  firm  entry  --  33.7  percent  in column  6 --  results  in a loss  in
scale  efficiency,  which  dominates  the  two  beneficial  effects  of  a  reduction  in
monopolistic  price  distortion  and a  reduction  in  the quota rent to
foreigners. 18 Because  of this  reduction  in the rent  premium,  when we
estimate  the  costs  of  the  VER  from  the  counterfactually  created  zero  profit
equilibrium,  we find  that  the  rent  costs  are  significantly  reduced  and  now
amount  to  67  percent  of the  total  costs. However,  despite  the  reduction  in
rent  costs,  the  total  costs  exceed  the  corresponding  CTRS  estimate  because  of
the significant  loss  of scale  efficiency,  as emphasized  by Hortsman  and
Markusen.
Now  introduce  the  realistic  assumption  of  international  capital  mobility
(row  4).  With  perfectly  mobile  capital,  the  rental  rate  is  fixed  in  terms  of
the  num4raire  and  the  returns  from  FDI  are  repatriated  to  foreign  capital
owners.  Clearly  removing  profits  involves  firm  entry  so  there  will  be  net  FDI
into  the  US with  the  returns  of  that  investment  accruing  to  foreigners.
Comparing  rows  4  and  3,  the  costs  of  eliminating  profits  are  $30 million  less
when  there  is international  capital  mobility. This  is  the  result  of three
offsetting  effects:  reduction  of rents to foreigners,  loss of scale
efficiency,  and  the  Brecher  and  Diaz-Alejandro  effect.  The  dominant  effect  is
the reduction  of rents  caused  by the slight  increase  in firm  entry  with
international  capital  mobility  (33.9  percent  vs.  33.7  percent  in  rows  3  and  4
of  Table  4). More  entry  occurs  because  the  auto  sector  is  relatively  capital
intensive.  (Entry  without  international  capital  mobility  raises  the  rental
rate  on  capital,  which  reduces  the  profitabllity  of  capital  intensive  sectors
such  as  autos  thereby  retarding  entry.)  More  entry,  because  of  no  increase  in
the  rental  rate,  raises  domestic  supply  which  lowers  the  demand  for  imported23
autos,  thereby  reducing  the  endogenously  deterrined  premium  rate  and  hence,  the
rents  to foreigners.
To further  decompose  these  effects,  we also estimated  the effects  of
firm entry to eliminate profits, with and without international  capital
mobility  under  the  assumption  of  exogenous  quota  rent  premium. Then,  the  costs
of firm  entry  are  $120  million  more  with international  capital  mobility. This
derives from two effects.  First,  greater  entry reduces scale efficiency.
Second,  as shown  by  Erecher  and  Diaz-Alejandro  (1977),  FDI  can  be immiserizing
if  the  marginal  product  of  imported  capital  (valued  at  world  prices,  to  reflect
the value of the social  marginal  product)  is less than the rental  rate on
capital,  as  would  be expected  to occur  when a quota  distorts  upward  the  value
of  the  private  marginal  product. Thus,  while  the  scale  efficiency  and  Brecher
and  Diaz-Alejandro effects  from  international capital  mobility  are
immiserizing,  they  are  dominated  by  the  beneficial  effect  international  capital
mobility  has on the  reduction  of the  quota  rent  premium.
Also note that  with capital  mobility,  distortion  costs  are slightly
higher  and  rent  costs  are  slightly  lower.  As explained  above,  capital  mobility
induces  more firm entry,  but it also increases  the elasticity  of domestic
supply. Since  entry  reduces  the  endogenous  rent  premium,  rent  costs,  which  are
estimated  from  the zero  profit  equilibrium,  are lower. Estimated  distortion
costs  are  lower  because  removing  the  VER induces  an inward  shift  of the  demand
curve for  domestic  autos  which results  in a smaller  decrease  in the domestic
price with a more elastic  domestic  supply  curve.  In turn, the demand  for
imported  autos  shifts  less  inward.  Consequently,  the  'triangle'  of  consumption
distortion  of imported  autos  is  greater  with capital  mobility  than  without. 19
This is the result  predicted  by Neary (1988)  and by Neary and Ruane (1988),
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namely  that the benefits  of eliminating  tariff  protection  (in  our case the
tariff  equivalent  of a VER) are greater  with interrnational  capital  mobility
than  without.
The results  of the simulations  presented  in rows 5 and 6 incorporate
strong US  monopsony power  in  autos and  correspond to  rows  3  and  4,
respectlvely.  We saw  earlier  in  the  CRTS  case  that  endogenizing  the  terms-of-
trade  resulted  in the  total  costs  of the  VER  being less  than the  rent  costs,
i.e.,  there  was an  efficiency  gain  from  the  VER  because  the  terms-of-trade
costs  were greater  than the  distortion  costs  of the  VER by $500  million.  In
column  4  of  rows  5  and  6,  we see  that  the  efficiency  gain  from  the  VER is  about
$900  million,  which is larger  than  under the  CRTS case.  This is  because,  as
discussed  above, with monopolistic  competition  there is a  loss of scale
efficiency  when the  VER is removed.
Finally,  consider  the  effects  of  endogenous  conjectures  (row  7),  so  that
firms  price  more (less)  competitively  as  entry  (exit)  occurs. With endogenous
conjectures,  it takes  less  entry  to eliminate  profits  (21.8  percent  compared
to  33.9  percent  in  row  4)  because,  as  firms  enter,  the  markup  is  reduced. Less
entry  implies  less  scale  efficiency  loss. thus,  the  welfare  costs  of  entry  to
eliminate  profits  results  In  losses  of only  60  million  from  entry  to  eliminate
profits. By inverse  reasoning,  when the  VER is removed,  there is less exit
with endogenous  conjectures. Hence the gain from VER removal is less. 20
Adding  endogenous  terms  of  trade  (row  8),  further  lowers  the  estimated  gain  for
reasons  dlscussed  above.25
6.  *Optimal'  Interventions  for  the  Auto  Industry
So far  we have calculated  the  costs  of the auto  VER with  Japan.
However,  as  long  as  there  is  either  IRTS  or  an  unremovable  distortion,  e.g.,
a distortionary  wage  differential  under  CRTS  or  IRTS,  the  question  of  optimal
industrial  policy  arises. We  now  consider  the  potential  welfare  galns  from
industrial  policy  in  a  non-strategic  context.  Although  Bhagwati  (1971)  has
shown  that  under  perfect  competition  the  optimal  policy  instrument  is  the  one
that acts  directly  on the relevant  margin,  no general  theorem  has been
established  under  imperfect  competition.  Consequently,  given  the  presence  of
IRTS  and  a  wage  distortion  in  the  auto  industry,  it  appears  useful  to  examine
the  "optimal'  use  of  either  a  tariff,  a  production  subsidy  or  a  wage  subsidy.
Due  to  the  algorithmic  difficulties  and  the  possibilty  of  multiple  equilibria,
efforts  to  calculate  numerically  the  optimal  values  of  policy  instruments  in
applied  general  equilbrium  are  virtually  non-existent. 21 We maximize  the
utility  function  (non-central  Stone-Geary)  underlying  the  final  demand  system
of  the  model,  using  as  instruments  a combination  of  a  tariff,  a  wage  subsidy
and  a  production  subsidy  in  the  auto  sector.  So  that  the  results  will  not  be
dominated  by second  best effects,  we  first  counterfactually  create  an
equilibrium  that  is  distortion  free,  except  for  the  wage  distortion  in  autos.
All  welfare  gain  estimates  are  relative  to  this  equilibrium.
The  results  are  presented  in  table  S. Consider  first  CRTS  results.  If
only  one instrument  is available,  the first  best  policy  to counteract  the
exogenous  wage distortion  is the  wage  subsidy. If a wage subsidy  is  not
available,  then  the  second  best  instrument  is  the  production  subsidy. The
production  subsidy  is considerably  inferior  to the  wage  subsidy  because  it
creates  the  by-product  distortion  of  overuse  of  the  non-labor  inputs  in  auto26
Table  St Optimal  trade  and  ledustrial  policies  for  the us  outo  Induasb.?
Inatrument\1odal  CRTS  Contestable  Monopollotte
Market  Competition
1.  Wn9 Subsidy
Weltare  gan  b  167.0  616.0  n0.0
Relative  wage  In  autos (wage  subsldy)  1.0  (27)  .7  (67)  1  6  (-3S)
-6.0
2.  Production  Subsid
Welfere  gain  24.0  977.0  264.0
Production  subsidy  1.8  10.0  6  4
3.  Tariff
Welfare  gain  4.0  182.0  80.0
Tariff  1.2  6.8  8  3
0.60
4.  Wage  and  Production  Subsidioe
Welfare  gain  b  167.0  1224.0  066.0
Relative  wage  In  autos  (wage  subsidy)  1.0  (27)  .67  (40)  1.6  (-63)
Production  subsidy  0.0  7.2  6  1
-46 
S.  LarIff  and  Production  Subsidy
Welfare  gain  J40  1364.0  B37.0
Production  subsidy  2.1  11.0  6.2
Tariff  2.2  12.2  604
6  0c
. Welfare  gain  estimates  are  In  millions  of  dollars.  All  subsidies  and  tarifs  are  In  percent.
b.  Relative  wage  In  autos  under  optimal  wags  subesdy  or  tax. Wage  subidy  or  tax  In  percentage  In
parenthese.  A  tax  rate  has  a  negative  sign.  All  rates  are calculated 4  roa  an Initial  condition  with
a  relativo  wage  In  autos  of  1.27.
c.  Porcentage change In the  nuaber  of  firm.27
production.  The third  best policy is the tariff  because it also creates  a
consumption  distortion  between  domestic  and  imported  autos. When  the  tariff  and
production  subsidy  instruments  are  available  together,  both  the  benefits  as  well
as the  tariff  and subsidy  rates  are larger  than  when the instruments  are  used
separately.  This  illustrates  the  principle  stated  by  Corden  (1974,  p. 23)s  If
a second  best policy is used to correct  one divergence,  hence  creating  a by-
product  disortion,  it  may  create  the  need  for  a  supplementary  policy  designed  to
correct,  at least  partially,  the  newly  created  distortion.* Finally,  note  that
when the  available  instruments  are  a  wage  and  production  subsidy,  the  algorithm
verifies that  the second  best  policy  instrument  is redundant.
Consider  now  IRTS.  There  is  now  also  the  possibility  of  welfare  gains  from
increasing  scale  efficiency  or  from  reducing  consumption  distortion  by  narrowing
the  difference  between  price  and  marginal  costs.  Regardless  of the  combination
of instruments,  welfare  gains  are  always  larger  under  contestable  markets  than
under monopolistic  competition  because there is no entry under contestable
markets  to reduce  scale  efficiency.  When only  one instrument  is available,  the
production  subsidy  yields  the  most benefits  because  scale  efficiency  benefits
(which  are most directly  achieved  with a production  subsidy)  dominate  labo
reallocation  benefits  with our  parameters.  When two  instruments  are  available,
by-product  distortions  are  partially  corrected  by the  second  instrument,  so  the
welfare  gains  are increased  as in the  CRTS case.
Note  that  under  monopolistic  competition  the  optimal  wage  policy  is  a  tax.
This  is because  the  tax  on auto  employment  induces  exit  of 5.9  percent  from  the
auto  sector,  and the  benefits  this  brings  in terms  of improved  scale  efficieny
dominate  the  costs  of additional  labor  misallocation. On the  other  hand,  with
contestable  markets,  because  the  wage subsidy  does  not  induce  entry,  the  optimal28
wage  policy  shifts  from  a  33  percent  tax  to  a 57  percent  subsidy.  This  is  the
type  of  result  Eaton  and  Grossman  (1986)  derived,  i.e.,  the  optimal  policy  shifts
from  a  subsidy  to  a  tax  depending  on  imperfect  competition  modelling  assumptlons
(in  our  case  entry  conditions).  These  results  confirm  the  need  for  caution
before  designing  optimal  industrial  policies  ln  imperfect  competition. 22
Moreover,  government  adoption  of these 'optimal*  policies,  may be
counterproductive  due  to strategic  considerations.  If industries  or unions
perceive  that the government's  policy  is to give subsidies  or tariffs  to
counteract  distortions,  the  distortions  are  likely  to  increase.  For  example,
union  wage demands  will increase  and  management  resistance  will diminish.
Moreover,  retaliation  by (or  GATT required  compensation  to) foreign  trade
partners  will  likely  eliminate  the  benefits  of  the  policies. 23 Consequently.
one  should  not  conclude  that  these  models  are  appropriate  for  the  definition  of
optimal  industrial  policy.
7. Conclusions
How  much  is  gained  by  a  careful  modelling  of  the  U.S.  auto  industry  under
the  U.S.-Japan  auto  VER?  Of  the  previously  unexamined  features  regarding  the
auto  VER that  were discussed  in the opening  paragraph,  one of the most
significant  empirically  is the endogenous  determination  of the quota rent
premium;  compared  to  calculations  with  exogenous  premla  rates,  the  estimated
reduction  in  costs  of  the  VER are  up to $1.9  billion. This  highlights  the
crucial  and  often  dominant  role  that  rents  play  in  the  welfare  analysis  of  VERs.
The  impact  of  foreign  direct  investment  is  also  to  lower  the  costs  of  the  VCR,
but  for  non-obvious  reasons:  the  greater  entry  into  domestic  auto  manufacturing
results  in a  lower  quota rent  premium  for foreign  autos.  We saw that29
'traditional  estimates  based  on  a  CRTS  technology  in  autos  yielded  velfare  costs
of about $10  billion.  In the  most reasonable  representation  with IRTS,  pure
profits,  internationally  mobile  capital  and  endogenous  conjectures  (between  fixed
and  our  particular  assumption  about  endogenous  conjectures)  then  the  estimate  of
the  welfare  costs  of the  VER are reduced  by about  $1  billion  or 10 percent.
It is also instructive  to note that the  costs  per job protected  in the
auto  sector  (at  the  expense  of employment  elsewhere)  are  very  high,  ranging  from
$164,000  to  $296,000  per  job  per  year. Alternatively,  obtaining  the  ratio  of  the
welfare  benefit  calculations  to the adjustment  costs,  proxied  by the  present
value  of  the  lifetime  earnings  losses  of  displaced  auto  workers  displaced  by  VER
removal,  there  are between  14 and 26 dollars  of benefits  for every  dollar  of
worker  adjustment  costs  saved. 24
Finally  we have illustrated  the use of industrial  policies  to exploit
scale  economies  and  to  counteract  wage distortions.  The  results  under  IRTS  call
for  caution  regarding  the  use  of  industrial  policy  because  the  optimal  policy  may
shift  from  a subsidy  to a tax  depending  on behavioral  assumptions.30
EIIDNOTUS
1.  Goto (1986)  examined  the impact  of wage distortions  in the
auto industry.  But he simulated  a  change from US autarky to
integration  into a single  economy with Japan, rather than the
effects  of the VER in autos.  De Melo and Tarr (1990b)  examined
separately  effects (1),  (2),  (4),  (5)  and (6).
2.  These  restraints  continued  into  1990.  See  General  Agreement
on Tariffs  and  Trade (1990,  p. 221).
3. Consumers  Union,  for  example  has  reported  that,  when  the  quota
was  in effect, many dealers charged in excess of the sticker
price, using such devices as charging high prices for decal
stripes,  rustproof  ing  and  undercoating.  Its  readers  indicate  that
this was  especially prevalent among Toyota, Honda and Mazda
dealers.  Consumer Reportst August 1983, 391.  See also the
statement  by Senator  Chafee,  Congressional  Record,  February  29,
1984,  S. 1966;  Fortune, "Can  Detroit  Live without  Quotas,"  June
25, 1984, 20; and Washinaton  Post, "Car Dealer Markups Raise
Questions,"  Washington  Business,  November  19, 1984,  1, 34, 35.
4.  See  de Melo and  Tarr  (1990b) for the  details of this
calculation.
5.  Using  a different  methodology,  de  Melo  and  Tarr (1990b),  find
a  similar  estimate  of the  premium  earned  by auto  workers. On the
other  hand,  the  wage  premium  used  by Dixit  and  by Krishna  et al.
is about double the actual wage premium because they did not
adjust  for  the  human  capital  differences  between  auto  workers  and
the average  manufacturing  worker.
6. An alternate  series  for  data  on  profits  in  motor  vehicles  and
equipment  is available  from  the Quarterly  Financial  Statistics,
published  by the  US Federal  Trade  Commission  until  1982  and  the  US
Bureau  of the Census  for  years  after  1982.  The Survey  of Current
Business  and  Quarterly  Financial  Statistics  series  differ  mainly
insofar  as the former  considers  profits  on US operations  only,
whereas the latter includes  income from all sources including
foreign operations. Both series would  include profits of US
subsidiaries  of foreign  corporations  in  their  US  operations,  i.e.,
profits of companies like Honda USA  earned on US  sales are
included in both; but  only  the  Quarterly Financial Reports
includes  profits  of Honda  USA on its sales  to Japan.
Between 1979  and 1984,  both series  are very close.  From 1985
on, however, the Quarterly  Financial  Reports series  shows much
higher profits. This principally  reflects  the increase in FDI
(shown  in table 1) and the profits  of US subsidiaries  on their
foreign  sales.  Since  we are  principally  interested  in  the  profits31
in the US market, we focus on the Survey of Current Business
series.  We thank  Paul Zareth  of the US Bureau  of the Census for
clarifying  these  distinctions.
7.  Faced with domestic competitors  who are more vertically
integrated,  the  Big  Three  have  begun  to  copy  the  Japanese  practice
of greater  vertical  integration  among  parts  suppliers,  suggesting
some  efficiency  enhancing  properties  of the  practice  in the auto
industry.  See  Lawrence (1990).
8.  Our  approach  is followed  by Krugman  (1987)  and  Krishna,  Hogan
and Swagel  (1989).  Devarajan and  Rodrik (1989) follow the
approach  of  Dixit.  Calibration  procedures  which  differ
substantively  from  ours  are  Smith  and  Venables  (1988),  who adjust
elasticities  to be consistent  with Cournot  conjectures,  and the
suggestion  of Saloner (1989)  that marginal  cost data should  be
adjusted.
9. Dixit  calibrated  N=13.9  for  1983.  If  we choose  0d=1, we obtain
N-4.2.  Since  the  industry  is  more  competitive  the  higher  the  value
of  N,  our  calibration  yields  a less  competitive  auto  industry  than
represented  by Dixit.
10.  Of course, perfectly  competitive  conjectures are  not
possible  in  the  presence  of fixed  costs  and  increasing  returns  to
scale  because  firms  will incur  losses. Novshek  (1980)  notes  that
simply adding  more firms  drives Cournot output  to zero in the
limit.  He shows,  however, that if the minimum efficient scale
becomes  small  in  relation  to  demand  as  the  number  of firms  goes  to
infinity,  then  Cournot  equilibria  with free  entry  exist  and  they
approach  perfect  competition.
11.  In addition to the estimate of table 1, The Quarterly
Financial  Reports indicates  that profits in motor vehicles and
equipment  were $10.8 billion in 1984 and the US International
Trade  Commission  indicates  that  the  industry's  profits  were $10.4
billion  in that  year.  We assume  any excess  of profits  over $9.4
billion  were normal.
12. Because  of interindustry  linkages,  this  step  involves  solving
simultaneously  for the entire  vector of prices that satisfies
firms,  budget  constraints  in all sectors.
13.  As shown  in de Nelo and Tarr (199Oc),  endogenous  aggregate
labor supply has a very small impact  on the welfare costs of
protection  in our formulation.
14.  Unlike previous elasticity  estimates,  Levinsohn clusters
autos  into  groups  that  take  into  account  characteristics,  prior  to
econometric  estimation  of the  price  elasticity  of demand. Hence,
the price  elasticities  of demand  in this  study  are likely  to be32
more accurate  than  previous  estimates.
15. All results  in  the  tables  are  reported  with  endogenous  quota
rent  premium  determination. See the appendix  for results  under
exogenous  quota  rent  premium  determination.
16.  Employment  loss  in  autos  is  less  in  the  high  elasticity  case
compared  to  the  central  elasticity  because  imported  and domestic
autos  are  not  as  close substitutes  in the high elasticity  case.
This  is  because  the  extent  to  which  imported  and  domestic  autos
are  gross  substitutes  depends  on  the difference between two
elasticities:  (1)  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  imported
and  domestic  autos  in  the  CES  nest  of  composite  autos;  and (2)  the
elasticity of  demand  for  composite autos.  Although  both
elasticities  increase  in the high  elasticity  case, the relevant
difference decreases.  See de .l4elo  and  Tarr  (1990b) for an
elaboration.
17. Analogously,  in  estimating  the job  protection  in  autos  duo  to
the  VER,  we add the jobs  generated  in the domestic  auto industry
due to entry and the jobs protected  by the VER. That is,,  auto
workers have jobs protected  while the VER is in effect, plus
additional  jobs  due to entry.
18.  To decompose  these  effects,  we have  simulated  the  effects  of
firm entry  under  the  inappropriate (but normally employed)
assumption  that the rent premium is exogenously  fixed at the
initial  level.  In  that  case,  the  costs  of firm  entry  to eliminate
profits increase to $2.59 billion so that firm entry induces
benefits  of $0.7  billion  due  to  the  reduction  in  the  rent  premium,
thereby  partially  defraying  the loss of scale efficiency.  The
total  cost of the VER with an exogenous  rent premium is $11.96
billion. Thus,  the  assumption  of an exogenous  or endogenous  rent
premium  has a very strong  effect  on the results.
19.  Graphical  expositions  of both this result  and of the bias
involved  in using  exogenous  versus  endogenous  quota rent  premia
determinations  are available,  upon  request,  in an appendix. The
appendix also replicates  tables 3 and 4 with exogenous rent
premium  determination.
20. Another  effect  operating  in  all  simulations  with  monopolistic
competition  is the  increase  in the  value  of the  market  elasticity
of demand (cd in equation 2) when protection  is removed.  The
increase  of about 3 percent  contributes  to lowering  the mark-up
rate,  but is generally  dominated  by entry  or exit in the mark-up
determination.
21. We use  the  MINOSS  algorithm  available  in the  GANS  programming
language  (see  Brooke  et al. (1988)).  An early  example  of optimal
numerical  solutions,  which  the  authors  characterized  an33
illustrative  because it was not a full numerical  model of an
actual  economy,  was  that  of  Harris  and  MacKinnon  (1979). Based  on
the  CRTS  version  of the  model  of this  paper,  de Nelo,  Stanton  and
Tarr (1989)  calculated  optimal  tariffs  and  taxes  in  the  US oil  and
petroleum  products  sectors.
22. Dixit  (1988)  and  Krishna  et al.  investigated  optimal  policies
in their  models.  They did not have a  wage subsidy instrument
available,  but they  found  a simllar  pattern  of results  to table  S
when production subsidies  or tariffs are used alone in their
scenarios  with labor  rent  present. Dixit finds  little  use for  a
tariff  when  both  a tariff  and  a  production  subsidy  are  available;
but his  model  considers  only  distortion  costs  in autos. Krishna
et al. find  that  the  optimal  policy  is  a subsidy  to imports  not a
tariff  when  there  is  no labor  rent,  a  result  that  led  them  to  also
call for  caution  in recommending  optimal  industrial  policy.
23.  See  Fernandez  (1989)  for  additional  strategic  considerations
which are likely  to make the achievement  of optimal industrial
policies  problematical.
24.  In de Melo and Tarr  (1990b)  we present data, baied on
Jacobson (1978), that indicate  that the present value of the
lifetime  earnings  losses  of a displaced  auto  worker  is about  $57
thousand. Using  this as a  proxy for  worker  adjustment  costs,  35
thousand displaced auto workers yield  about  $2  billion of
adjustment  costs. The  benefits  of  quota  removal  (the  avoidance  of
the quota costs) discounted  conservatively  over 6 years (at 7
percent),  are  between  $29  billion  (row  8)  and  $53  billion  (row  4).
See de Melo  and Tarr (1990b)  for  details  on the methodology.34
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Appendix
In the  main body  of the  paper,  we argued  that  calculations  of the
costs  of rent  transfers  occasioned  by VERs are  usually  calculated  imprecisely.
We also argued  that the  estimated  distortion  costs  of  VERs are  larger  with FDI,
because  FDI raises  the  elasticity  of supply. Section  Al explains  graphically
why endogenous  rent  premium  determination  will  make an Important  difference.
We then report  results  of simulations  in  which  it is assumed,  inappropriately.
that  the rent  premium  in autos  is exogenously  fixed. All  of the simulations  in
tables  3  and 4 are  replicated  with exogenous  rent  premium  determination  as
tables  3A and  4A.
Section  A2 describes  how  the  model  is  modified  to accommodata
exogenous  wage distortions  and international  capital  mobility. It also
provides  a graphical  exposition  of the  elasticity  effect  of international
capital  mobility  described  in the  text.
Al.  Endogenous  Versus  Erogenous  Quota  Rent  Premium  Determination
VERs allow  the  exporting  firms  to capture  rents. As  illustrated  in
figure  Al, the rent  premium,  however,  is  determined  residually.  For
simplicity,  consider  a pure final  good in  partial  equilibrium  where  the
imported  and  domestic  goods  are  differentiated.  Given  the  rationed  quantity  of
imports,  qo, a  price  po clears  the  market,  where  d(q)  is inverse  demand  for
imports. Since  tariffs  must be paid  on the  imports  (tm  is the  ad  valorem
rate),  the  rent  premium  is  the  difference  between  the  price  that  clears  the
inverse  tariff-ridden  demand  curve,  d(q)/(l  * tm),  and  the foreign  supply
price, i.e.,  po/(1  +  tm)  - PW ER.38
Since  rent  determination  depends  only  on  the  tariff-ridden  demand
curve,  in  figure  A2  we  delete  depiction  of  the  demand  curve. In  panel  A,  we
depict  endogenous  rent  determination  and  in  panel  B,  exogenous  rent
determination.  Consider  a  decrease  in  demand  for  auto  imports  that  would  occur
as  a  result  of  an  increase  in  entry  into  domestic  auto  rroduction,  with  the  VER
quota  fixed.  This  is  depicted  as  an  inward  shift  in  the  tariff  ridden  demand
curve  from  d0(q)/(l  +  tm)  to  dl (q)/(l  +  tm). Assuming  the  VER  remains
binding,  the  decrease  in  demand  reduces  the  per  unit  rent  premium,  to  P1  - PW
ER  on  the  same  total  amount  of  imports.  This  is  depicted  in  panel  A. Panel  B
depicts  rent  determination  in  the  case  of  exogenous  rent  premia.  Since  the
model  requires  market  clearing  and  a  fixed  rent  premium,  the  quantity  of
imports  is  reduced  to  accommodate  the  decline  in  demand.  Without  allowing  the
quantity  to  vary,  the  model  is  overdetermined.  The  equilibrium  is  shown  in
panel  B. The  difference  between  panels  A and  B is  that  in  B  the  quantity  of
imports  is  endogenous  as  opposed  to  the  rent  premium  in  A.  Since  with  a
binding  quota,  it  is  the  quantity  not  the  rent  premium  that  is  exogenous,  the
appropriate  method  is  to  assume  an  endogenous  rent  premium  as  in  panel  A.
Tables  3A  and  4A  replicate  the  simulations  of  tables  3  and  4  in  the
main  text  with  exogenous  rent  premium  determination.  This  allows  the  reader  to
assess  the  extent  of  bias  resulting  from  the  assumption  of  an  exogenous  rent
premium  coupled  with  an  endogenous  import  level.
A2. Wage  Distortions  and  International  Capital  Mobility
Wage  Distortions
When  we  assume  there  are  wage  distortions  in  autos,  we  assume  the
prewm'um  earned  by  auto  workers  *  is  exogenous.  Then  throughout  the  system  of39
equations  in  table  A.1  we replace  the  auto  sector's  wage  rate  W  with  Wi  i  -
autos,  where  Wi = Wo (W  is  the  wage  rate  earned  in  sectors  where  workers  do  not
receive  rents).
International  Capital  Mobility
In  simulations  with  international  capital  mobility,  we  assume  the
United  States  has  an  infinitely  elastic  supply  of  capital  at  a  fixed  interest
rate  and  the  proceeds  from  foreign  direct  investment  accrue  to  the  owners  of
the  capital  stock.
The  distortion  costs  of  removing  the  VER  are  greater  because,  as
explained  in  the  text,  introducing  capital  mobility  raises  the  elasticity  of
domestic  supply.  Figure  A3  shows  the  welfare  effects  of  removing  a  VER  in
partial  equilibrium  when  domestic  and  foreign  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes.
When  the  VER  is  removed  (panel  B),  the  reduction  in  the  price  of  imported  autos
from  po  to  0W  ER,  induces  an  inward  shift  in  the  demand  curve  for  domestic  autos
(Do  to  D1 in  panel  A). A  higher  elasticity  of  supply  results  in  a smaller
price  decrease  (Pe  instead  of  PI)  when  there  is  capital  mobility.  In  turn,
this  implies  a  smaller  inward  shift  of  the  demand  for  imported  autos  in  panel  b
(dJ  instead  of  di). The  result  is  a  larger  welfare  gain  with  capital  mobility
(area  ABD)  than  without  (area  ABC). This  is  the  result  predicted  by  Neary
(1988)  and  by  Neary  and  Ruane  (1988),  namely  that  the  benefits  of  eliminating
tariff  protection  (in  our  case  the  tariff  equivalent  of  a  VER)  are  greater  with
international  capital  mobility  than  without.Figure Al
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